Abstract. Robust secret sharing enables the reconstruction of a secretshared message in the presence of up to t (out of n) incorrect shares. The most challenging case is when n = 2t + 1, which is the largest t for which the task is still possible, up to a small error probability 2 −κ and with some overhead in the share size.
Introduction
Background. Robust secret sharing is an extended version of secret sharing as originally introduced by Shamir [14] and Blakley [4] , where the reconstruction is required to work even if some of the shares are incorrect (rather than missing, as in the standard notion). Concretely, a robust secret sharing scheme needs to satisfy t-privacy: any t shares reveal no information on the secret, as well as t-robust-reconstructability: as long as no more than t shares are incorrect the secret can be reconstructed from the full set of n (partly correct, partly incorrect) shares. For t < n/3 this can easily be achieved by means of error correct techniques, whereas for t ≥ n/2 the task is impossible. Thus, the interesting region is n/3 ≤ t < n/2, respectively n = 2t + 1 if we want t maximal, where robust secret sharing is possible but only up to a small error probability 2 −κ (which can be controlled by a statistical security parameter κ) and only with some overhead in the share size (beyond the size of the "ordinary", e.g., Shamir share). There are many works [2, 3, [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 11, 13] in this direction.
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The classical scheme proposed by Rabin and BenOr [13] has an overhead in share size of O(κn), i.e., next to the actual share of the secret, each player has to hold an additional O(κn) bits of information as part of his share. This additional information is in the form of n − 1 authentication tags and keys. Concretely, every player P i holds n − 1 authentication keys key i,j that allow him to verify the (Shamir) shares s j of all parties P j , plus n − 1 authentication tags σ i,j that allow the other parties to verify his share s i by means of their keys. By this way, the honest parties can recognize all incorrect shares-and, in case the reconstructor is not a share holder, he would keep those shares that are correctly verified by at least t + 1 other parties and dismiss the others (note that a dishonest share holder may also lie about his authentication key, and thus make look a correct share incorrect).
Cevallos, Fehr, Ostrovsky and Rabani [6] proposed an improvement, which results in an overhead in share size of O(n + κ) instead. The core insight is that in the Rabin-BenOr scheme, one can reduce the size of the authentication keys and tags (and thus weaken the security of the authentication) at the expense of a slightly more involved reconstruction procedure-and a significantly more involved analysis. Since the linear dependency of the overhead on κ is unavoidable, they posed the question of whether the linear dependency on n is necessary, or whether an overhead of O(κ) is possible.
Bishop, Pastro, Rajaraman and Wichs [3] gave a positive answer to this question by proposing a scheme that indeed has an overhead in share size of O(κ). At first glance, this seems to settle the case. However, a subtle issue is that their scheme is proven secure only against a weaker attacker than what is considered in the above works. Concretely, the security of their scheme relies on the (implicit) assumption that the attacker is non-rushing, whereas the above discussed schemes remain secure in the presence of a rushing attacker. As such, the open question of Cevallos et al. [6] is not fully answered.
Recall that for the attacker to be rushing, it means that during the reconstruction procedure, when the parties announce their shares, he can decide on the incorrect shares of the corrupt parties depending on the shares that the honest parties announce (rather than on the shares of the corrupt parties alone). This is in particular meaningful and desirable if it is the parties themselves that do the reconstruction-in this case there is little one can do to prevent the corrupt parties from waiting and receiving the honest parties's shares, and then "rush" and announce their own shares before the end of the communication round. Even if the shares (which may include authentication tags and keys etc.) are announced gradually, in multiple rounds, in each round the attacker can still rush in that sense.
To the best of our knowledge, it has not been pointed out before that the scheme of Bishop et al. does not (necessarily) offer security against a rushing attacker. It is also not explicitly discussed in [3] , but becomes clear when inspecting the considered security definition carefully.
The Scheme in [3] . We briefly discuss some of the features of the scheme by Bishop, Pastro, Rajaraman and Wichs [3] , and why it is not secure against a rushing adversary. Like the schemes above, their scheme is also based on verification of shares by means of pairwise authentication using a message authentication code (MAC). However, in order to reduce the number of keys and tags so as to obtain an overhead that is independent of n, every party can now verify only a subset of the shares of the other parties, where the subset is randomly chosen (during the sharing phase) and of constant size. However, this makes the reconstruction procedure much more delicate, and Bishop et al. [3] need to pair this basic idea with various additional clever tricks in order to get the reconstruction working. One of these enhancements is that they need to avoid that a dishonest party can make an honest party look dishonest by announcing an incorrect authentication key without being identified as a cheater by other honest parties. This is done by authenticating not only the Shamir share of the party under consideration, but also that party's authentication keys. Concretely, if P j is chosen to be one of the parties that P i can verify, then this verification is enabled by means of an authentication tag σ i,j that is computed as
where key i,j is P i 's verification key, and key j is the collection of keys that P j holds for verification of the shares (and keys) that he can verify.
2
It is now not hard to see that this construction design is inherently insecure against a rushing adversary. Even if the reconstruction is done in multiple rounds where first the Shamir shares and authentication tags are announced and only then the keys (which is what one has to do to make the Rabin-BenOr scheme and the scheme by Cevallos et al. secure in the rushing setting), given that a rushing adversary can choose an incorrect key j depending on the authentication key key i,j , the MAC offers no security. Worse, this cannot be fixed by, say, enhancing the MAC: either the adversary has some freedom in choosing incorrect key j once given key i,j , or then it is uniquely determined by key i,j and so P i knows it-and so it cannot serve the purpose of an authentication key. 2 One might feel uncomfortable about that there seems to be some circularity there; but it turns out that this is no issue. 3 The actual scheme is significantly more involved than the simplifies exposition given here, e.g., the identities of the parties that Pj can verify are authenticated as well, and the authentication tags are not stored "locally" but in a "robust and distributed" manner, but the issue pointed out here remains.
We emphasize that we do not claim an explicit rushing attack against the scheme of Bishop et al. [3] . What the above shows is the existence of an attack that prevents a certain property on the consistency graph to hold upon which the reconstruction procedure appears to crucially rely-certainly the proof does. Thus, our claim is that we see no reason why the scheme of Bishop et al. should offer security against a rushing adversary.
Our Result. In this work, we propose a new robust secret sharing scheme. Our new scheme is secure against a rushing adversary and close to optimal in terms of overhead. By "close to optimal" we mean that our new scheme has an overhead of O(κn ε ) and runs in polynomial time for any arbitrary fixed constant ε > 0. This is obviously slightly worse than the scheme of Bishop et al. [3] , which has an overhead of O(κ · polylog(n)), but it greatly improves over the best known scheme that features security against a rushing adversary when n is significantly larger than κ.
Our approach recycles some of the ideas from Bishop et al. [3] (e.g. to use "small random subsets" for the verifying parties, and to store the authentication tags in a "robust and distributed" manner) but our scheme also differs in many aspects. The crucial difference is that we do not require the authentication keys to be authenticated; this is what enables us to obtain security against a rushing adversary. Also, how the reconstruction actually works-and why it works-is very different. In our approach, we mainly exploit the expander property of the "verification graph" given by the randomly chosen set of neighbors for each P i , i.e., the set of parties whose share P i can verify.
For instance, in a first step, our reconstruction procedure checks if the number of incorrect Shamir shares is almost t (i.e., maximal) or whether there is a small linear gap. It does so by checking if there are t + 1 parties that accept sufficiently more than half of the shares they verify. This works because by the random choice of the neighbors, the local view of each honest party provides a good estimate of the global picture (except with small probability). e.g., if almost half of all the shares are incorrect, then for each honest party roughly half of his neighbors has an incorrect share.
If the outcome is that there is a (small but positive) linear gap between the number of incorrect shares and t then we can employ list-decoding to obtain a poly-size list of possible candidates for the secret. In order to find the right secret from the list we need to further inspect the "consistency graph", given by who accepts whom. Concretely, for every secret on the list (and the corresponding error-corrected list of shares) it is checked if there exist t+1 parties whose shares are deemed correct and who accept a party whose share is deemed incorrect. It is clear that this cannot happen if the secret in question is the right one, because no one of the t + 1 honest parties would accept an incorrect share. And, vice versa, if the secret in question is incorrect then, because of the promised redundancy in the correct shares, there must be a certain number of correct shares that are deemed incorrect and, with the parameters suitably chosen, each honest party has one of them as neighbor (except with small probability) and so will accept that one.
If, on the other hand, the outcome of the initial check is that there are almost t incorrect shares, then the reconstruction procedure uses a very different approach to find the correct shares. Explaining the strategy in detail is beyond the scope of this high-level sketch, but the idea is to start with a set that consists of a single party and then recursively pull those parties into the set that are accepted by the current parties in the set. The hope is that when we start with an honest party then we keep mostly including other honest parties. Of course, we cannot expect to end up with honest parties only, because an honest party may pull a party into the set that has announced a correct share (and thus looks honest) but which is actually dishonest and accepts incorrect shares of other dishonest parties, which then get pulled into the set as well. But note, given that we are in the case of almost t incorrect shares, there are not many such "passively dishonest" parties, and we can indeed control this and show that if we stop at the right moment, the set will consist of mainly honest parties and only a few dishonest parties with incorrect shares. By further inspection of the "consistency graph", trying to identify the missing honest parties and removing dishonest ones, we are eventually able to obtain a set of parties that consists of all honest parties, plus where the number of "actively dishonest" parties is at most half the number of "passively dishonest" parties (except with small probability), so that we have sufficient redundancy in the shares to recover the secret (using Reed-Solomon error correction).
By choosing the out-degree of the "verification graph" (i.e., the number of parties each party can verify) appropriately, so that the above informal reasoning can be rigorously proven (to a large extent by exploiting the randomness of each party's neighborhood and applying the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound), we obtain the claimed overhead O(κn ε ) for an arbitrary choice of ε > 0. As a simple variation of our approach, by choosing the out-degree of the "verification graph" to be polylog(n), we obtain the same (asymptotic) O(κ) overhead as Bishop et al. [6] and still have security against a rushing adversary, but then the reconstruction becomes (slightly) superpolynomial (because the size of the list produced by the list-decoder becomes superpolynomial).
Preliminaries

Graph Notation
Let G = (V, E) be a graph with vertex set V and edge set E. By convention, (v, w) ∈ E is the edge directed from v to w. For S ⊆ V , we let G| S be the restriction of G to S, i.e., G| S = (S, E| S ) with E| S = {(u, v) ∈ E : u, v ∈ S}. Furthermore, we introduce the following notation.
For v ∈ V , we set
We often write E v as a short hand for N out (v), and call it the neighborhood of v.
We extend this notation to a labeled graph, i.e., when G comes with a function L : E → {good, bad} that labels each edge. Namely, for v ∈ V we set We refer to a graph G = (V, E) as a randomized graph if the edges E are chosen in a randomized manner, i.e., if E is actually a random variable. We are particularly interested in randomized graphs where (some or all of) the E v 's are uniformly random and independent subsets E v ⊂ V \ {v} of a given size d. For easier terminology, we refer to such neighborhoods E v as being random and independent.
Chernoff Bound
Like for [3] , much of our analysis relies on the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound, and its variation to "sampling without replacement". Here and throughout, [n] is a short hand for {1, 2, . . . , n}. [1] ). Let X 1 , . . . , X n be binary random variables. We say that they are negatively correlated if for all I ⊂ [n]:
Definition 1 (Negative Correlation
Theorem 1 (Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound). Let X 1 , . . . , X n be random variables that are independent and in the range 0 ≤ X i ≤ 1, or binary and negatively correlated, and let u = E n i=1 X i . Then, for any 0 < δ < 1:
and Pr[
As immediate consequence, we obtain the following two bounds. The first follows from Chernoff-Hoeffding with independent random variables, and the latter from Chernoff-Hoeffding with negatively correlated random variables. We refer to [1] for more details, e.g., for showing that the random variables X j = 1 if j ∈ E v and 0 otherwise are negatively correlated for E v as in Corollary 1. 
We emphasize than when we apply these corollaries, we consider a graph G where a priori all E v 's are random and independent. However, our reasoning typically is applied a posteriori, given some additional information on G, like the adversaries view. As such, we have to be careful each time that the considered neighborhoods are still random conditioned on this additional information on G.
Robust Secret Sharing
A robust secret sharing scheme consists of two interactive protocols: the sharing protocol Share and the reconstruction protocol Rec. The sharing protocol is executed by a dealer D and n parties 1, . . . , n: the dealer takes as input a message msg, and each party i ∈ {1, . . . , n} obtains as output a so-called share. Typically, these shares are locally computed by the dealer and then individually sent to the parties. The reconstruction protocol is executed by a receiver R and the n parties: each party is supposed to use its share as input, and the goal is that R obtains msg as output. Here, the protocol is typically so that the parties send their shares to R (possibly "piece-wise", distributed over multiple rounds of communication), and R then performs some local computation.
Such a robust secret sharing should be "secure" in the presence of an adversary that can adaptively corrupt up to t of the parties 1, . . . , n. Once a party is corrupted, the adversary is able to see the share of this party, and he can choose the next corruption based on the shares of the currently corrupt parties. Furthermore, in the reconstruction protocol, the corrupt parties can arbitrarily deviated from the protocol and, e.g., use incorrect shares. The following captures the security of a robust secret sharing in the list of such an adversary.
Definition 2 (Robust Secret Sharing). Such a pair (Share, Rec) of protocols is called a (t, δ)-robust secret sharing scheme if it satisfies the following properties hold for any distribution of msg (from a given domain).
-Privacy: Before Rec is started, the adversary has no more information on the shared secret msg than he had before the execution of Share. -Robust reconstructability: At the end of Rec, the reconstructor R output msg = msg except with probability at most δ.
On the Power of Rushing
As defined above, there is still some ambiguity in the security notion, given that we have not specified yet the adversary's (dis)ability of eavesdropping on the communication of the sharing and the reconstruction protocols. Obviously, for the privacy condition to make sense, it has to be assumed that during the execution of the sharing protocol the adversary has no access to the communication between D and the uncorrupt parties. On the other hand, it is commonly assumed that the adversary has access to the communication between the parties and R during the execution of the reconstruction protocol. This in particular means that the adversary can choose the incorrect shares, which the corrupt parties send to R, depending on the honest parties' (correct) shares. 4 Such an adversary is referred to as a rushing adversary. In contrast, if it is assumed that the adversary has to choose the incorrect shares depending on the shares of the corrupt parties only, one speaks of a non-rushing adversary. Thus, Definition 2 above comes in two flavors, depending on whether one considers a rushing or a non-rushing adversary. Obviously, considering a rushing adversary gives rise to a stronger notion of security. In order to deal with a rushing adversary, it is useful to reveal the shares "in one go" but piece-by-piece, so as to limit the dependence between incorrect and correct shares.
In this work, in order to be in-par with [13] and [6] , we require security against a rushing adversary. On the other hand, the scheme by Bishop, Pastro, Rajaraman and Wichs [3] offers security against a non-rushing adversary onlyand, as explained in the introduction, there are inherent reasons why it cannot handle a rushing adversary.
Overview of Scheme
Our Approach. As in [3] , the sharing phase is set up in such a manner that every party i can verify (by means of a MAC) the Shamir shares of the parties j of a randomly sampled subset E i ⊂ [n]\{i} of parties. However, in contrast to [3] , in our scheme only the Shamir share is authenticated; in particular, we do not authenticate the authentication keys (nor the set E j ).
If the reconstruction is then set up in such a way that first the Shamir shares are announced, and only afterwards the authentication keys, it is ensured (even in the presence of a rushing adversary) that the consistency graph, which labels an edge from i to j ∈ E i as "good" if and only if i correctly verifies j's Shamir share, satisfies the following: -All edges from honest parties to passive or honest parties are labeled good. -All edges form honest parties to active parties are labeled bad.
Here, and in the remainder, a corrupt party is called active if it announced an incorrect Shamir share in the reconstruction, and it is called passive if it announced a correct Shamir share, but may still lie about other parts, like the authentication keys. This is a significant difference to [3] , where it is also ensured that corrupt parties that lie about their authentication keys are recognized as well.
Divide the Discussion. Similarly to [3] , the reconstructor first tries to distinguish between the (non-exclusive) cases |P | ≤ n and |P | ≥ n 4 , where P denotes the set of passive parties (as defined above). In order to do so, we observe that the honest party is expected to have (|P | + |H|) d n good outgoing edges, where H is the set of honest parties. Thus, if there exist t + 1 parties with more than (1 + )d/2 good outgoing edges, we are likely to be in the case |P | ≥ n 4 , and otherwise |P | ≤ n.
Based on this distinction, the reconstructor will then refer to either of the following two algorithms to recover the secret.
Code Based Algorithm. This algorithm is used to handle the case |P | ≥ n 4 . Here, one can use the redundancy provided by the correct shares of the parties in P to do list-decoding. This works given that the Shamir sharing is done by means of a folded Reed-Solomon code. Since those are maximum distance separable (MDS) codes, the corresponding secret sharing scheme is still threshold; moreover, it enjoys the nice feature that we can apply list decoding to correct up to t − n/4 corruptions for any small constant . Finding the right entry in the list can then be done by a further inspection of the consistency graph.
Graph Algorithm. This graph algorithm is used in case |P | ≤ n. The basic algorithm starts off with a particular party, and produces the correct secret (with high probability) if that party happens to be honest. Hence, applying this algorithm to all choices for that party and taking a majority enables to reconstruct the secret.
The algorithm consists of three steps.
-The first step is to find a big subset V that contains many honest parties and very small proportion of dishonest parties. We do so by starting off with V = {i} for a particular party i (which we assume to be honest for the discussion) and recursively include all parties into V that are correctly verified by the parties in V . A simple argument shows that in each step, we expect to include d/2 honest parties and at most d passive parties. By the expander property of the consistency graph restricted to the honest parties ensures that the set V will soon be expanded to a set containing many honest parties. On the other hand, we can limit the "damage" done by passive parties by only including parties that have at most d 2 (1 + 3 ) good outgoing edges. Given that there are only very few passive parties and that we limit the number of active parties they can pull into V , we can show that V can be expanded to a set of size Ω( n) such that at most a O( √ )-fraction of the parties in V are corrupt.
-The next step is to rely on the authentication of parties in V to include all honest parties and few dishonest parties where the majority is passive. We first expand V to contain all honest parties and at most O( √ n) dishonest parties. Then, we remove all active parties from V (but possibly also some honest and passive ones). Let W be the set of all parties removed from V . We show that the resulting set V still contains almost all honest parties and few passive parties, and W is of size O( √ n) and contains the rest of honest parties. A subtle issue now is that the sets V and W above depend on the E i 's of the honest parties; this then means that now given these two sets, we cannot rely anymore on the randomness of the E i 's. In order to circumvent this, we resort to another layer of authentication that is done in parallel to the former, with fresh E i 's, and by means of this, we can then eventually identify a subset S ⊆ [n] that contains all t + 1 honest parties, as well as some number h of passive parties and at most h 2 active parties (with high probability).
-Given that we have "sufficiently more redundancy that errors", the secret can now be recovered by means of Reed-Solomon error correction (noting that a codeword of a folded Reed-Solomon code is also a codeword of some classic Reed-Solomon code).
Building Blocks
We present three building blocks here which are used in our construction.
Shamir Secret Sharing with List Decoding
It is well known that the share-vector in Shamir's secret sharing scheme is nothing else than a codeword of a Reed-Solomon code. Thus, Reed-Solomon decoding techniques can be applied when we are in the regime of unique decoding. Furthermore, if we use a folded Reed-Solomon code, then we still get a Shamir-like threshold secret sharing scheme, but in addition we can employ list-decoding when we are in a regime were decoding is not unique anymore. In summary, we have the following (see Appendix A. 1 and [12] for the details). 
MAC Construction
Similarly to [3] , our construction requires a message authentication code (MAC) with some additional features. There is some overlap with the features needed in [3] , but also some differences. The above privacy condition will be necessary for the privacy of the robust secret sharing scheme, since the Shamir shares will be authenticated by means of such a MAC but the corresponding tags will not be hidden from the adversary.
The uniformity property will be crucial in a lazy sampling argument, were we need to "simulate" certain tags before we know which messages they actually authenticate. With the uniformity property, this can obviously be done by picking σ uniformly at random from T . When m and r become available, we can then sample a uniformly random key key subject to MAC key (m, r) = σ. This has the same distribution as when key is chosen uniformly at random and σ is computed as σ = MAC key (m, r).
The following variation of the standard polynomial-evaluation MAC construction meets all the requirements.
Theorem 2 (Polynomial Evaluation). Let F be a finite field. Let
Then, this family of MAC functions is ( , )-secure.
Robust Distributed Storage
A robust distributed storage scheme is a robust secret sharing scheme as in Definition 2 but without the privacy requirement. This was used in [3] in order to ensure that dishonest parties cannot lie about the tags that authenticate their shares (so as to, say, provoke disagreement among honest parties about the correctness of the share).
5 Also our construction uses a robust distributed storage scheme for storing the authentication tags. It does not play such a crucial role here as in [3] , but it makes certain things simpler.
A robust distributed storage scheme can easily be obtained by encoding the message by means of a list-decodable code and distribute the components of the code word among the parties, and to give each party additionally a random key and the hash of the message under the party's key (using almost-universal hashing). In order to reconstruct, each party runs the list-decoding algorithm and uses his key and hash to find the correct message in the list. The exact parameters then follow from list-decoding parameters.
Therefore, each party i holds two components, the i-th share of list-decodable code, p i , and a hash-key and the hash of the message, jointly referred to as q i . While [3] did not consider a rushing adversary, it is easy to see that security of this robust distributed storage scheme against a rushing adversary can be obtained by having the parties reveal p i and q i in two different communication rounds (so that the adversary has to decide on an incorrect p i before he knows the keys that the honest parties will use). Therefore, the following result from [3] , which is obtained by using suitable parameters for the list decoding an hashing, is also applicable in rushing-adversary model. 
The Robust Secret Sharing Scheme
Sharing Protocol
Let t be an arbitrary positive integer and n = 2t + 1. Let > 0 be a small constant and d = n √ . Let (Sh, Lis) be the sharing and list decoding algorithm of the threshold secret sharing scheme in Proposition 1 with γ = 4 . Also, we use the MAC construction from Theorem 2 with = 4d, and with the remaining parameters to be determined later (but chosen so that a share produced by Sh can be authenticated).
On input msg ∈ F q , our sharing procedure Share(msg) proceeds as follows.
1. Let (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ← Sh(msg) to be a non-robust secret sharing of msg.
For each
] with in-degree more than 2d, do it again.
Let E i , key i,j and σ i→j be the output of the first round and E i , key i,j and σ i→j be the output of the second round.
For each i ∈ [n], define tag
. Use the robust distributed storage scheme to store tag. Party i holds p i and q i .
For i ∈ [n], define s
to be the share of party i.
Output (s 1 , . . . , s n ). 
Reconstruction Protocol
Remark 1.
We emphasize that since the keys for the authentication tags are announced after the Shamir shares, it is ensured that the MAC does its job also in the case of a rushing adversary. Furthermore, it will be crucial that also the E i 's are revealed in the second round only, so as to ensure that once the (correct and incorrect) Shamir shares are "one the table", the E i 's for the honest parties are still random and independent. Similarly for the E i 's in the third round.
On receiving the shares of n parties, our reconstruction scheme Rec(s 1 , . . . , s n ) goes as follows:
1. R collects the share of robust distributed storage: (p i , q i ) i∈ [n] . 2. Reconstruct the tag = (tag 1 , tag 1 , . . . , tag n , tag n ) and parse tag i = {σ i→j :
j ∈ E i } and tag i = {σ i→j : j ∈ E i }.
Define two graphs G = ([n], E) and G
and bad otherwise. Do the same thing to the edge e ∈ E . Note that step 5 in the reconstruction refers to subroutines: Check, List and Graph, which we specify only later.
The Privacy Property
Theorem 5. The scheme (Share, Rec) satisfies perfect privacy.
Proof. Let C ⊂ [n] be of size t. We let msg ∈ M be arbitrarily distributed and consider Share(msg) = (s 1 , . . . , s n ). Our goal is to show that the distribution of (s i ) i∈C is independent of msg. Note that
Since our threshold secret sharing scheme has t-privacy, the collection of shares s i for i ∈ C is independent of msg. By construction, r i , E i , E i , K i , K i are independently chosen as well. Since the (p i , q i )'s are computed from tag (using independent randomness), it suffices to show that tag reveals no information on msg. Recall that tag is used to verify the integrity of (s j , r j ) for all j. For any j / ∈ C, there are at most 4d tags σ i→j = MAC keyi,j (s j , r j ) corresponding to the total degree of vertex i in two graphs. By the "privacy over randomness" of the MAC, tag is independent of these shares s j , and hence the privacy of msg is ensured.
The Robustness Property
Preliminary Observations
From the security properties of the robust distributed storage and of the MAC, we immediately obtain the following results.
Lemma 1. tag is correctly reconstructed expect with probability
This is not negligible; this will be dealt with later by parallel repetition.
Here and in the remainder of the analysis of the robustness property, H denotes the set of honest parties, and C denotes the set of dishonest parties. Furthermore, we decompose C into C = A ∪ P , where A is the set of dishonest parties that announced an incorrect (s i , r i ) in the first communication round and P denotes the (complementary) set of dishonest parties that announced a correct (s i , r i ). The parties in A are called active parties, and the parties in P are referred to as passive parties.
Proposition 2. If tag was correctly reconstructed then the labelling of the graph G satisfies the following, except with probability mac ≤ 4(t+4d)dt/|T |. For every h ∈ H and for every edge e = (h, j)
∈ E h = N out (h), it holds that L(e) = bad if j ∈ A good if j ∈ H ∪ P .
I.e., all the edges from honest parties to active parties are labeled bad and all edges from honest parties to honest parties or passive parties are labeled good. The same holds for G .
Proof. By the definition of passive parties and the construction of MAC, all edges from honest parties to passive parties are labeled good. It remains to prove the first half of the claim. Let us fix an active party i. According to the definition of active party, he claims (s j , r j ) = (s j , r j ) ∈ T a × T 4d . For any honest party i with j ∈ E i or j ∈ E i , the edge (i, j) is label good if σ i→j = MAC keyi,j (s j , r j ). This event happens with
due to the authentication of MAC. Note that each vertex has at most 4d incoming edges. Taking a union bound over all these edges and the active parties, the desired result follows.
On the Randomness of the Graph
Much of our analysis relies on the randomness of the graph G (and G ). A subtle point is that even though a priori all of the E i are chosen to be random and independent (in the sense as explained in Sect. 2.1), we have to be careful about the a posteriori randomness of the E i given the adversary's view. In particular, since the adversary can corrupt parties adaptively (i.e., depending on what he has seen so far), if we consider a particular dishonest party j then the mere fact that this party is dishonest may affect the a posteriori distribution of G. However, and this is what will be crucial for us is that, conditioned on the adversary's view, the E i 's of the honest parties i remain random and independent.
Proposition 3. Up to right before the second communication round of the reconstruction protocol, conditioned on the adversary's view of the protocol, the graph G is such that the E i for i ∈ H are random and independent. The corresponding holds for G up to right before the third communication round.
Proof. The claim follows from a straightforward lazy-sampling argument. It follows by inspection of the protocol that one can delay the random choice of each E i (and E i ) to the point where party i gets corrupted, or is announced in the corresponding round in the reconstruction protocol. The only subtle issue is that, at first glance it seems that the computation of the tags σ i→j = MAC keyi,j (s j , r j ) for j ∈ E i requires knowledge of E i . However, by the uniformity property of MAC, these tags can instead be "computed" by sampling d tags uniformly at random from T , and once party i gets corrupted and E i is sampled, one can choose the keys key i,j appropriately for j ∈ E i .
Remark 2.
In the sequel, when making probabilistic statements, they should be understood as being conditioned on an arbitrary but fixed choice of the adversary's view. This in particular means that H, P and A are fixed sets then (since they are determined by the view of the adversary), and we can quantify over, say, all honest parties. The randomness in the statements then stems from the randomness of the E i 's (and E i 's) of the honest parties i ∈ H, as guaranteed by Proposition 3 above.
Remark 3.
The remaining analysis below is done under the implicit assumption that tag is correctly reconstructed and that the labelling of G and of G is as specified in Proposition 2. We will incorporate the respective error probabilities then in the end.
The Check Subroutine
Roughly speaking, the following subroutine allows the reconstructor to find out if |P |, the number of passive parties, is linear in n or not.
Check(G, L, )
-Input: G = ([n], E, L) and . -If |{i ∈ [n] : n out (i, good) ≥ d 2 (1 + )}| ≥ t + 1, then output "Yes". -Otherwise, output "No".
Theorem 6. Except with probability
check ≤ 2 −Ω( d) , Check(G, L, )
outputs "Yes" if |P | ≥ n and "No" if |P | ≤ n/4 (and either of the two otherwise).
Proof. We only analyze the case that |P | ≤ n 4 . The same kind of reasoning can be applied to the case |P | ≥ n. By Proposition 3 (and Remark 2), we know that for given P and H, the E i 's for i ∈ H are random and independent. It follows that n out (i, good) = n out P ∪H (i) is expected to be 
Taking a union bound over all honest parties, we have
Thus, except with probability (t + 1) For honest v, it is ensure to output the correct secret (with high probability), and so we can do a majority decision. We leave the description and the analysis of the code based algorithm and the graph algorithm to the respective next two sections.
Code Based Algorithm
Recall that γ = 4 . H is the set of honest parties, P is the set of passive parties and A is the set of active parties. In this section, we present an algorithm List(G, s, γ) based on the list decoding algorithm of secret sharing scheme in Proposition 1 up to t − γn errors.
Code Based Algorithm, List(G, s, γ)
-Run the list decoding algorithm on s to correct up to t−γn errors and output the list of candidates (c 1 , . . . , c ). -Let S i (T i ) be the set of parties whose shares agree (do not agree) with c i .
If the output is "succeed" then output c i .
-Output "fail".
We proceed to the analysis of the algorithm. The input of the list decoding algorithm is n shares of s. Since |P | ≥ γn, there are at most t − γn = n 2 (1 − 2γ) shares that are corrupted. Thus, by Proposition 1, the output of this list decoding algorithm will contain the correct codeword with probability at least 1 − 2 −Ω(n) . Moreover, the list size of this algorithm is at most ( 
O(1/γ log 1/γ) . We may assume that this list only include codewords that are at most t − γn away from the n shares. Let c 1 , . . . , c be the candidates on this list. To find the correct one, we resort to the labelled graph G = ([n], E, L). Note that c i for 1 ≤ i ≤ are determined right after the first communication round. Thus, by Proposition 3, conditioned on c 1 , . . . , c (and the entire view of the adversary at this point), the E i 's for i ∈ H are random and independent. For each candidate c i , we run the algorithm Cand(G, S i , T i , γ) to check if it is the correct codeword. For the correct codeword c r , we claim that this algorithm Cand(G, S r , T r , γ) will always output succeed. To see this, we notice that S r must contain the set of t+1 honest parties H. Meanwhile, T r is a subset of active parties A. By our assumption, there does not exist good edge from H to T r . The desired results follows as these t + 1 honest parties will remain in S r after calling Cand (G, S r , T r , γ) .
Verify the candidate, Cand(G, S, T )
It remains to show that with high probability this algorithm will output fail for all of the incorrect candidates.
Lemma 2. If c i is not a correct codeword then the algorithm Cand(G, S i , T i ) will output fail except with probability at most 2 −Ω(γd) .
Proof. By the guarantee of the list decoding algorithm, it is ensured that |T i | ≤ t − γn and thus |S i | ≥ t + 1 + γn. Let W i be the set of passive and honest parties in T i . We observe that |W i | ≥ γn; otherwise, c i and the correct codeword would have t+1 shares in common, which would imply that they are the same codeword. Furthermore, for every honest party j in S i , we have that
and Corollary 1 ensures that this is 0 with probability at most 2 −Ω(γd) . Taking union bound over all honest parties in S i , with probability at least 1 − 2 −Ω(γd) , all the honest parties will be removed from S i . The desired result follows as S i has size at most t when all honest parties are removed.
Taking a union bound over all these candidates, we obtain the following. 
O( 1 ) .
Graph Algorithm
In this section, we assume that our graph algorithm Graph(G, G , , v) starts with an honest party v. Under this assumption and |P | ≤ n, we show that this algorithm will output the correct secret with high probability. Recall that the out-degree of vertices in G and G is d = n √ for some small constant and that by assumption (justified by Proposition 2) the edges from honest parties to active parties are labeled bad, and the edges from honest parties to honest or passive parties are labeled good.
We also recall that, by definition, whether a corrupt party i ∈ C is passive or active, i.e., in P or in A, only depends on s i and r i announced in the first communication round in the reconstruction protocol; a passive party may well lie about, say, his neighborhood E i . Our reasoning only relies on the neighborhoods of the honest parties, which are random and independent conditioned on the adversary's view, as explained in Proposition 3 and Remark 2.
The graph algorithm Graph(G, G , , v) goes as follows. Note that n out W refers to n out W but for the graph G rather than G, and similarly for n in V .
The algorithm Graph(G, G , , v)
ii. Expand set V = {v} to include more honest parties:
iii. Include all honest parties into V :
. iv. Remove all active parties from V (and maybe few honest parties as well):
v. 1. Bound the degree of parties in V :
2. Include the honest parties from W (and perhaps few active parties):
3. Error correction: run the unique decoding algorithm on the shares of parties in V and output the result.
Remark 5. Each time we call Expan(G, V, ), the size of V increases. After
Step ii, we hope that the V has size Ω( n) instead of barely bigger than t d . To achieve this, we require that the input V of the last loop to be of size Ω( . Take out each party in V with same probability such that the expectation of resulting V is less than t 2d . Then, the proportion of honest party and dishonest party stays almost the same but the size of V is below the threshold t d with probability at least 1 − 2 −Ω( n/d) . It will not affect our randomness argument since we treat each party equally. We skip this step for simplicity. In our following analysis, we assume that V has size Ω( n) at the end of Step ii. 
Graph expansion algorithm Expan(G, V, )
We will prove this theorem in the following subsections.
Graph Expansion
We start by analyzing the expansion property of G| H , the subgraph of G restricted to the set of honest parties H.
Lemma 3 (Expansion property of G| H ). If H ⊂ H is so that |H | ≤ |H| d
and the E v 's for v ∈ H are still random and independent in G when given H and H, then
Informally, this ensures that, as long as H is still reasonably small, including all the honest "neighbours" increases the set essentially by a factor d/2, as is to be expected: each party in H is expected to pull in d/2 new honest parties. The formal proof is almost the same as the proof for a random expander graph except that we require a different parameter setting for our own purpose.
Proof. By assumption on the E i 's and by Corollary 1, the probability for any 
Taking over all vertex sets of size d 2 N in these d N neighbours, the union bound shows that p f is at most
The first inequality is due to that n k ≤ 2 nH( k n ) and the second due to
for small and the Taylor series ln(1 − x) = i≥1
Analysis of Step ii
The following shows that after
Step ii, at most an O( √ )-fraction of the parties in V is dishonest. This is pretty much a consequence of Lemma 3.
Proposition 4. At the end of
Step ii, with probability at least 1 − 2
Proof. Let V i be the set V after Expan has been called i times, i.e., V 0 = {v}, V 1 = Expan(G, V 0 , ) etc., and let H 0 = {v} and
be the corresponding sets when we include only honest parties into the sets. Using a similar lazy-sampling argument as for Proposition 3, it follows that conditioned on H 0 , H 1 , . . . , H i , the E j 's for j ∈ H i \ H i−1 are random and independent for any i. 7 Therefore, we can apply Lemma 3 to
with probability 2
According to Remark 5, our algorithm jumps out of
Step ii when V is of size Ω( n). We bound the number of rounds in this step.
, it thus follows that
That means Expan(G, V, ) is called r ≤ 2 √ times assuming n is large enough. On the other hand, we trivially have |V r | ≤ (
r by specification of Expan. Thus,
The first equality is due to a 
Analysis of Step iii
The intuition for the next observation is simply that because V consists almost entirely of honest parties, every honest party v not yet in V will get sufficient support in
Step iii from the parties in V to be included as well; indeed, any such v is expected have close to 
By union bound over all honest parties outsideH, all these honest parties are added to V with probability at least 1 − 2 −Ω( d) . On the other hand, any active party w outside V needs at least d1 2 good incoming edges to be admitted. These edges must come from dishonest parties in V . Since there are at most O( √ )|V | of them in V and each of them contributes to at most d good incoming edges, the number of active parties admitted to V is at most
Analysis of Step iv
By construction, after
Step iv, V and W together obviously still contain all honest parties. Furthermore, as we show below, there is now no active party left in V and only few honest parties ended up in V . The idea here is that the active parties in V will be recognized as being dishonest by many honest parties in V .
Proposition 6. At the end of
Step iv, with probability at least 
By union bound over all active parties in V , all of them are removed from V with probability at least 1 − t2
On the other hand, if the honest party v is removed from V , he must receive at least In order to analyze the last step (see next section), we introduce the following notation. We partition V into the set of honest parties V H and the set of passive parties V P . We also partition W into the set of honest parties W H and the set of dishonest parties W C . From above, we know that
Analysis of Step v Proposition 7. Except with probability 2 −Ω(d) , after
Step v the set V will contain all honest parties and at least twice as many passive parties as active ones. Therefore, Step v will output the correct secret with probability at least 1−2
Note that, given the adversary's strategy, all the previous steps of the graph algorithm are determined by the graph G. Therefore, by Proposition 3, at this point in the algorithm the E i 's for i ∈ H are still random and independent given
Hence, by union bound, all honest parties in V remain in V except with probability 2 −Ω(d) .
Let V P be the set of passive parties left in V after this step, and set p := |V P |.
Step v.2. Observe that
Thus, all honest parties in W are added to V , except with probability 2 −Ω(d) . On the other hand, the active parties only receive good incoming edges from passive parties in V P . Observe that each party in V is allowed to have at most Step v.3. Observe that the shares of the parties in S form a code with length |V | and dimension (t+1). Since the fraction of errors is at most
2|V | , by Proposition 1, the unique decoding algorithm will output a correct secret.
Parameters of Construction and Parallel Repetition
We first determine the parameters in our algorithm and then show how to reach the security parameter κ by parallel repeating this algorithm for O(κ) times. This parallel repetition idea comes from [3] . Assume that there are n parties and mbit secret msg to share among these n parties. Note that we have already set 
We summarize our result as follows. Next, we describe how to achieve the security parameter δ = 2 −κ based on this "weakly-robust" secret sharing scheme (Share, Rec) with δ = O(
Given a secret msg, we run Share(msg) q = O(κ) times to produce q robust sharings msg, except that the first step of Share(msg) is executed only once, i.e., only one set of non-robust shares (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ← Sh(msg) is produced, and then re-used in the otherwise independent q executions of Share(msg). This is exactly the same idea as that in [3] . The resulting share size is then O(m+κn √ ). The analysis is almost the same as that in [3] , so we omit it here. 
Further Improvement and Existence Result
If we do not consider the efficiency of our algorithm, by setting proper parameters, our algorithm can also achieve the optimal O(m + κ) share size. The algorithm is exactly the same as we described above except that we set = ). This parameter setting will affect the efficiency and error probability of our algorithm. We briefly review this improvement by pointing out the differences. 
A Appendix
A.1 Folded Reed-Solomon Codes
Instead of using the Reed-Solomon codes to share our secret, our robust secret sharing scheme is encoded by the folded Reed-Solomon codes. Since the folded Reed-Solomon code is a class of MDS codes, it is an eligible candidate for threshold secret sharing scheme. Moreover, the folded Reed-Solomon codes first introduced by Guruswami and Rudra [10] can be list decoded up to 1 − R − γ fraction of errors for any constant γ. This extra nice property allows us to divide our reconstruction scheme into two scenarios, one with small number of passive parties and another with big one. Let us first introduce the formal definition of fold Reed-Solomon codes. Let q be a prime power, n + 1 ≤ It is easy to verify that FRS q,s (n + 1, d) is an F q -linear code with code length n + 1, rate d+1 (n+1)s and distance at least (n + 1) − d s . The folded Reed-Solomon code is a class of MDS code when d + 1 is divisible by s. In our robust secret sharing scheme, we set n = 2t + 1 and d + 1 = (t + 1)s. For every secret s ∈ F s q , we find the P (X) of degree at most d uniform at random such that s = (P (β), P (β 2 ), . . . , P (β s−1 )). The party i receives the i + 1-th component of c P . It is easy to verify that this scheme is a threshold secret sharing scheme with t-privacy and t + 1-reconstruction. Moreover, if we write the n shares as (P (β s ), P (β s+1 ), . . . , P (β (n+1)s−1 )) ∈ F ns q .
Then, it becomes a classic Reed-Solomon codes with length ns, dimension (t+1)s and distance (n − (t + 1))s + 1. We will use this fact in our robust secret sharing scheme.
Besides the MDS property, the folded Reed-Solomon codes enjoy a large list decoding radius up to the Singleton bound while the list size is bounded by a polynomial in q. There are many works aimed at reducing the list size of the folded Reed-Solomon codes. Recently, Kopparty et al. [12] proved that the list size of the folded Reed-Solomon codes is at most a constant in γ.
Theorem 12 (Theorem 3.1 [12] Remark 6. By running this polynomial list decoding algorithm n times and taking the union of all its output, with probability at least 1 − 2 −Ω(n) , we will find all the codewords within distance 1 − d sn − γ to the corrupted vector. This error probability is good enough for our robust secret sharing scheme. Compared with the approach in [10] , the new algorithm runs faster and ensures a significantly small list of candidates.
